Still think Obama is a moderate? Want to see what kind of change he might bring? Read all about it here. Among other things, it turns out the Great New Hope Of The Left was personally instrumental in priming the banking crisis we're facing right now, representing ACORN in the lobbying drive that forced the strengthening of the Community Reinvestment Act and started the whole subprime-mortgage ball rolling.
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http://www.businessweek.com/investing/insights/blog/archives/2008/09/community_reinv.html
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I would add that it's easy to see how deregulation of the banking industry -- in particular, allowing banks to buy and sell bundles of mortgages and other debt just like securities -- furnished a constant powerful incentive for banks to write risky mortgages. Any time you set things up so a toxic product can easily be made someone else' problem, you're asking for trouble, whether it's nuclear waste, mine tailings, or a bundle of several thousand mortgages. A bank officer who refused to take part in the subprime-mortgage free-for-all would be passing up obvious short-term profits (i.e. asking to be fired and replaced by someone more aggressive). The ability to buy and sell bundles of mortgages meant that the risk was, if not invisible, much less obvious than the profits, and at least theoretically something you could pass on to someone else.
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It'd be sort of like going to a vegetable stand and telling them,
"We're now going to allow you to sell hamburger that's up to three days past its marked 'Sell By' date."
"...Uh, that's, uh, nice, I guess ... but we don't sell hamburger. We sell vegetables."
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http://calculatedrisk.blogspot.com/2008/08/reflections-on-alt.html
And from this article at the St. Louis Fed:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross.pdf
"The subprime loan securitization
rate has grown from less than 30 percent in
1995 to over 58 percent in 2003. The securitization
rate for conventional and jumbo loans has
also increased over the same time period.5 For
example, conventional securitization rates have
increased from close to 50 percent in 1995-97 to
more than 75 percent in 2003."
So by 1995, sub-prime loan securitization already existed, and the first CRA securities weren't issued until November 1997 according to this article:
http://www.allbusiness.com/personal-finance/real-estate-mortgage-loans/677967-1.html
Short answer, blaming the CRA even for securitization of sub-prime is wrong. During the 1990's EVERY kind of loan was securitized, including car and credit card and every possible grade of mortgage.
The CRA also does not require banks to issue loans that are "bad risks" (i.e. don't have a sufficiently high interest rate to cover the risk.) Somewhere I've got a link to a survey of banks by the Fed that basically says "yes, CRA loans are profitable or very profitable to our bank."
From the second article above, which is basically an ad for selling securitization services:
Three important bits:
"Under the Community Reinvestment Act guidelines, a bank gets credit for originating loans or buying on a whole loan basis; but you get no credit for holding the loans. Conversely, if you sell your loans through a securitization, a buyer can get CRA investment credit if a percentage of the loans is based in the buying bank's trade area."
and a bit earlier in the article:
"Was it banks seeking CRA investment credit? No, it wasn't. The overwhelming participants were money managers and insurance companies buying the loans strictly because of their investment appeal."
and a bit later:
"the credit scores were fairly evenly dispersed along the four standard quartile levels (620 or less, 620-659, 660-719, 720 or more)."
So they're not even necessarily to people with bad credit either. A school teacher, policeman, or fireman, who is earning half the median wage in San Francisco, with perfect credit, counts as a CRA loan.
And the only point of doing CRA securitization, compared to normal sub-prime securitization, is to let banks earn brownie-points so they don't have to pay blackmail to ACORN, etc.
There may be some effects of HUD pushing lenders to write more low-income loans, but that's _NOT_ part of CRA.
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This? I have seen no evidence that CRA loans in general, or sub-prime CRA loans in specific, were given better terms than other sub-prime loans. And I've seen no evidence that CRA sub-prime loans default at any higher rates than sub-prime loans for other populations.
If you can find default data on CRA loans that shows is significantly higher than comparable sub-prime loans, especially during the 1998-2003 time period, I'd love to see it because everything I've seen says it is comparable or better given loan quality.
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The main point of deregulation was to let bankers and brokers be as clever as they could be with securities, including mortgage-based securities and mixed bags of securities, credit-debit swaps, etc. They predictably out-clevered themselves, as they did in 1929.
I would like to see documentation for your contention that ACORN forced banks to take on bad risks. The CRA didn't force banks to disregard reasonable ways of assessing a loan applicant's likely ability to pay.
My take on it is, once banks didn't have to hold on to the mortgages they wrote, any loan officer who didn't write all the mortgages he could was a damned fool. In the short term, they'd be money for him; in the long term, they'd be Somebody Else's Problem. It turned real-estate loans into an extractive industry like logging or whaling, where it can be shown that absent regulation the winners will be those who quickly get in, grab all they possibly can, and get out. The "losers" are left holding bad securities. The real losers (we taxpayers) are bailing out the "losers," some of whom are paid more per hour than I am per year.
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To put it another way, it wasn't CRA's fault per se, but CRA was misused by ACORN as a big stick to beat the banks up with.
And that is the heart of the problem, isn't it? That's how we got into this mess — "Somebody else's problem."
In the end, we're all "Somebody else". To paraphrase, "It's not the bullet with your name on it that gets you, it's one of the fifty thousand marked 'To whom it may concern' or 'Somebody Else's Problem'."
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And the banks had no incentive to fight back -- they could securitize the loans and palm them off on someone else. So the applicant got the loan, ACORN looked like a hero, the bank looked like it finally saw the light, and if the loan didn't perform, who cares, it's Someone Else's Problem now.
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