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bruce_schneier_feed - Time-of-Check Time-of-Use Attacks Against LLMsjhetley - (no subject)bruce_schneier_feed - Hacking Electronic Safesjhetley - Transient passagemilktree - Toward fascism...milktree - a napple, a nadder, a napron, a semblance..jhetley - (no subject)bruce_schneier_feed - Microsoft Still Uses RC4jhetley - And so it beginsjhetley - (no subject)jhetley - (no subject)bruce_schneier_feed - Lawsuit About WhatsApp Securityjhetley - Whether 'tis noblerbruce_schneier_feed - Upcoming Speaking Engagementsjhetley - (no subject)jhetley - Sunday morning blahsjhetley - (no subject)jhetley - (no subject)jhetley - Saturday miscellaneous reportThis is a nice piece of research: “Mind the Gap: Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use Vulnerabilities in LLM-Enabled Agents“.:
Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM)-enabled agents are rapidly emerging across a wide range of applications, but their deployment introduces vulnerabilities with security implications. While prior work has examined prompt-based attacks (e.g., prompt injection) and data-oriented threats (e.g., data exfiltration), time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) remain largely unexplored in this context. TOCTOU arises when an agent validates external state (e.g., a file or API response) that is later modified before use, enabling practical attacks such as malicious configuration swaps or payload injection. In this work, we present the first study of TOCTOU vulnerabilities in LLM-enabled agents. We introduce TOCTOU-Bench, a benchmark with 66 realistic user tasks designed to evaluate this class of vulnerabilities. As countermeasures, we adapt detection and mitigation techniques from systems security to this setting and propose prompt rewriting, state integrity monitoring, and tool-fusing. Our study highlights challenges unique to agentic workflows, where we achieve up to 25% detection accuracy using automated detection methods, a 3% decrease in vulnerable plan generation, and a 95% reduction in the attack window. When combining all three approaches, we reduce the TOCTOU vulnerabilities from an executed trajectory from 12% to 8%. Our findings open a new research direction at the intersection of AI safety and systems security.
Vulnerabilities in electronic safes that use Securam Prologic locks:
While both their techniques represent glaring security vulnerabilities, Omo says it’s the one that exploits a feature intended as a legitimate unlock method for locksmiths that’s the more widespread and dangerous. “This attack is something where, if you had a safe with this kind of lock, I could literally pull up the code right now with no specialized hardware, nothing,” Omo says. “All of a sudden, based on our testing, it seems like people can get into almost any Securam Prologic lock in the world.”
[…]
Omo and Rowley say they informed Securam about both their safe-opening techniques in spring of last year, but have until now kept their existence secret because of legal threats from the company. “We will refer this matter to our counsel for trade libel if you choose the route of public announcement or disclosure,” a Securam representative wrote to the two researchers ahead of last year’s Defcon, where they first planned to present their research.
Only after obtaining pro bono legal representation from the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Coders’ Rights Project did the pair decide to follow through with their plan to speak about Securam’s vulnerabilities at Defcon. Omo and Rowley say they’re even now being careful not to disclose enough technical detail to help others replicate their techniques, while still trying to offer a warning to safe owners about two different vulnerabilities that exist in many of their devices.
The company says that it plans on updating its locks by the end of the year, but have no plans to patch any locks already sold.
Senator Ron Wyden has asked the Federal Trade Commission to investigate Microsoft over its continued use of the RC4 encryption algorithm. The letter talks about a hacker technique called Kerberoasting, that exploits the Kerberos authentication system.
Attaullah Baig, WhatsApp’s former head of security, has filed a whistleblower lawsuit alleging that Facebook deliberately failed to fix a bunch of security flaws, in violation of its 2019 settlement agreement with the Federal Trade Commission.
The lawsuit, alleging violations of the whistleblower protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in 2002, said that in 2022, roughly 100,000 WhatsApp users had their accounts hacked every day. By last year, the complaint alleged, as many as 400,000 WhatsApp users were getting locked out of their accounts each day as a result of such account takeovers.
Baig also allegedly notified superiors that data scraping on the platform was a problem because WhatsApp failed to implement protections that are standard on other messaging platforms, such as Signal and Apple Messages. As a result, the former WhatsApp head estimated that pictures and names of some 400 million user profiles were improperly copied every day, often for use in account impersonation scams.
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:
The list is maintained on this page.